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Abstract -- Intensive long-term customer-supplier relations, or hybrids, are becoming a prevalent feature of 
more and more industrial markets. Received transaction cost economics and the interaction approach 
developed in the context of the International Marketing and Purchasing projects give different (arguably: 
complementary) accounts of the mechanisms underlying hybrids and the factors leading to their formation. A 
model integrating elements of both approaches is developed. The model is dynamic in that it consists in 
propositions regarding the occurrence of shifts from one form of governance to another. 
Key words:  Transaction cost economics, interaction approach, institutionalization, hybrid governance, 
customer-supplier relations. 
INTRODUCTION 
A form of industrial  organization  becoming more and more prevalent and receiving growing 
academic attention  over the last two decades is that of intensive long-term customer-supplier 
relations  in industrial  markets (e.g. Dwyer et at., 1987; Lyons et al., 1990; Powell, 1987; Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1992, 1994; Semlinger,  1991). While the f'Lrms engaged in these relationships 
formally remain independent,  they cooperate in ways not easily reconciled with the conventional 
concept of arm's-length  market interaction.  This cooperation often comprises areas like 
production, logistics,  quality assurance,  and research and development. Not seldom the buying 
firm relies on a supplier as the sole source of a given input, and the supplier realizes a substantial 
part of its sales with a single client. Also not infrequently one of the parties incurs considerable 
investments in time and money without any formal guarantee  for continued business. This is 
often true,  for instance,  for suppliers engaging in cooperative development efforts with their 
clients. Almost inevitably mutual or unilateral  adaptations of processes and equipment are 
implemented, adaptations  that only pay off if the relationship  continues. 
These intensive long-term customer-supplier relationships  are often referred to as hybrids, 
because they seem to combine characteristics  of hierarchical  governance with characteristics  of 
market governance, as far as duration,  adjustment mechanisms,  and the nature of commitments 
are concerned (Noorderhaven,  1994; Williamson,  1991a).  The boundaries of the concept of 
*This paper is a product of a project sponsored  by the Economics Research Foundation, which is part of  The Netherlands' 
Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). Valuable comments made by Paul de Laat, Peter Smith Ring, and three 
anonymous reviewers are gratefully acknowledged. The author is responsible for any remaining errors. 
43 N.G. NOORDERHAVEN 
hybrid governance are often drawn wider, to include such disparate organizational forms as joint 
ventures (Kogut, 1988), strategic alliances (Borys and Jemison, 1989), and interorganizational 
networks (Jarillo, 1988). Obviously, it would be a gross simplification to group all these phe- 
nomena within a single category. It also is an open question whether hybrids are adequately char- 
acterized as intermediate forms between the end-points of market and hierarchy, or: must be 
assumed to form a separate basic type in their own right (Alvesson and Lindkvist, 1993;' Bradach 
and Eccles, 1989; Larsson, 1993). 
In this paper I will not focus on the genera  ! question of the conceptualization of hybrid gov- 
ernance, but rather concentrate on the more specific phenomenon of intensive long-term buyer- 
seller relationships in industry, and on two related questions in this context. The first of these 
questions pertains to the mechanisms endorsing commitments in the class of hybrid retations 
scrutinized in this paper, compared to those operative in market relations. Market relations are 
assumed to be disciplined by the forces of competition, a firm not living up to its commitments 
will soon be out of business. The first question now is: what is the equivalent mechanism endors- 
ing commitments in the context of hybrids? The second question concerns the dynamics of gov- 
ernance: how to explain shifts from the market to hybrid governance and vice versa? 
The first question is important because the mechanism endorsing (mutual) commitment can 
be seen as the "glue" that keeps the parties to a transaction relationship together. Unless we under- 
stand the nature of this "glue", we cannot understand the transaction relationship. The second 
question is important because real-world transaction relations are ever-changing. The explana- 
tion of shifts from one governance form to another forms an essential part of a theory of trans- 
action relations. The two questions are interrelated because the limitations of the various mech- 
anisms endorsing commitments will presumably be a major cause of changes in governance 
forms. 
This paper is prompted by dissatisfaction with the answers to these questions provided by an 
influential school of thought, viz. transaction cost economics (TCE), as initiated by Coase (1937) 
and developed by Williamson (1975, 1985, 1991a). This dissatisfaction in turn has been fuelled 
by the findings of the empirical investigations associated with the interaction  approach.  The 
interaction approach (IA) has been developed in the context of the International Marketing and 
Purchasing projects, conducted by teams of researchers from various European countries with, 
as their focal point, Uppsala University in Sweden (see, e.g. H~kansson, 1987, 1989; H,~tkansson 
and Johanson, 1992, 1993; Halltn, 1982; Halltn et al., 1991). 
Transaction cost theory is taken as a point of departure in the discussion contained in this 
paper. I use elements of IA and observations stemming from the associated empirical work in 
order to infuse TCE with more realism, and to make the theory more dynamic. The resulting 
model integrates elements of both approaches, but in its emphasis on the possibility of oppor- 
tunistic behaviour and the importance of safeguards it is probably much closer to the core of TCE 
than to that of IA. Nevertheless, it may provide some middle ground to two schools of thought 
that as yet have not established much rapport (cf. Halltn,  1982; Johanson and Mattson,  1987; 
Nooteboom, 1994). 
The paper proceeds as follows: first the position of TCE with regard to hybrid governance is 
dealt with. After that IA is discussed, and the differences and similarities between IA and TCE 
are examined. These differences and similarities are subsequently shown to be closely associated 
with the assumptions pertaining to rationality and human motivation maintained by both schools 
of thought. The next section focuses on the rationality issue, and establishes a link to neo-insti- 
tutionalist theory. Subsequently the outlines of a dynamic model of hybrid governance, integrat- 
ing insights from TCE and IA, are sketched. Concluding remarks follow. TRANSACTION, INTERACTION, INSTITUTIONALIZATION  45 
TCE AND HYBRID GOVERNANCE 
In his early versions of TCE Williamson failed to recognize the viability of intermediate gov- 
ernance forms, but in later work this has been rectified. The occurrence of hybrids is explained 
in TCE on the basis of comparative production and transaction costs. Hybrid governance is likely 
to arise if economies can be realized through the use of a production technology specific to a par- 
ticular group of clients. Consider for example a supplier producing body parts for the automobile 
industry. The press used for stamping body parts is not specific to one particular client, but, 
assuming it can only be used to produce these body parts, it is specific to a small group of clients. 
The press is used in conjunction with dies which are specific to particular clients. The indepen- 
dent supplier has a potential production cost advantage, assuming that it can through the aggre- 
gation of demand achieve economies of scale inaccessible to the client firms (Williamson, 1975, 
pp.  16-19, 1985, p.  116). However, if the independent supplier would keep its clients at arm's 
length, investment in the press would be risky. The client firms may act opportunistically, and 
force down the price knowing that the supplier has no alternative use for the press. This causes 
transaction costs to be high. A possible solution would be to let the client firms pay for dies spe- 
cific to the press owned by the supplier. Now both parties have a stake in the relationship, which 
has acquired the identity of a particular type of hybrid, viz. quasi-integration (Masten,  1984; 
Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Palay, 1984). 
With regard to the first question raised above the answer of received TCE is that the risks asso- 
ciated with the adaptation, specific investments, etc. that come with hybrid relations call for safe- 
guards. These safeguards can take two forms: legal ordering and private ordering. In the case of 
legal ordering the parties draw up a formal contract, covering as many of the aspects of the rela- 
tionship as feasible, and often of a very long duration (Goldberg and Erickson, 1987; Joskow, 
1985, 1987, 1988; Mulherin, 1986). Market governance is in principle also buttressed by contract 
law, but recourse to the judiciary is not a part of the normal expectations but rather is used only 
in the last resort. Consequently, contracts tend to be rudimentary or even nonexistent in market 
deals (Macaulay, 1963). In the case of private ordering the relationship is designed to achieve a 
balance of mutual dependency. Williamson (1983, 1985) proposes the use of "hostages" (in the 
metaphorical sense of the word) as the chief expedient for the achievement of a balance of mutual 
dependency. The investment in a die specific to the supplier's press, incurred by the client firms 
in the example above, is an example of the economic equivalent of a hostage. 
The answer of received TCE to the second question is that economic agents deliberately craft 
relationships on the basis of considerations of production and transaction costs (Williamson, 
1985, p. 106, 1991b). Reduced to its essence, TCE is a two-period model: in the first period the 
relevant decisions with regard to investments and governance structure are made; in the second 
period the actual transactions follow. TCE is geared to the comparative static analysis of gover- 
nance structures, and offers very little in the way of a theory of gradual change from one gover- 
nance structure to the other. 
IA AND HYBRID GOVERNANCE 
TCE can be characterized as  a  deductive theory, starting from clearly stated simplifying 
assumptions and working towards refutable propositions that are subsequently confronted with 
selected slices of reality. IA works from the opposite side, assimilating with managerial practice 
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data used in most empirical tests of TCE, the data produced by IA-related research are mostly of 
a qualitative nature. This, however, does not mean that they should be taken less seriously, the 
more so since some of the observations made in IA studies unexpectedly resound in the conclu- 
sions of TCE-related surveys (cf. Noorderhaven, 1994). 
A preliminary point that has to be dealt with before the position of IA vis-d-vis hybrid inter- 
finn relations can be discussed is the question whether IA really relates to hybrids as defined here. 
Ostensively, IA focuses on networks of actors in which a multitude of exchange processes take 
place. Thus, on the face of it IA applies a different level of analysis (Johanson and Matsson, 
1987).  However, while the importance of wider networks is emphasized, at closer inspection 
much of the empirical work in IA appears to focus on dyadic exchange. In Hakansson (1989), for 
example, the research method consisted in interviews with focal firms that were asked to provide 
information about their relationships with important customers and suppliers. These relationships 
in many cases can be characterized as hybrids. 
If we now look at the findings with regard to hybrid relations of IA studies the following obser- 
vations are relevant. Firstly, mutual adaptation  is seen as a crucial aspect of these relations. 
Intensive  long-term  customer-supplier  relations  reduce  uncertainty,  give  access  to  scarce 
resources, and facilitate innovation and technological development (HLkansson, 1987,  1989; 
H,~tkansson  and Johanson, 1992, 1993; Johanson and Mattsson, 1987). They can serve these func- 
tions so well because the parties adapt products, production processes, and innovation processes 
to the needs of their counterparts (Hall6n, 1982, p. 20; Hall6n et al., 1991, p. 30). The concept of 
"adaptation" closely resembles TCE's "asset specificity". 
Other observations made in the IA literature are less easily reconciled with TCE. For instance, 
the importance of the history of the relationship is repeatedly emphasized (e.g. H/tkansson, 1989, 
pp.  24 and 126).  Long-lived interfirm relations not only lead to mutual adaptation but also, 
through social exchange processes, to personalized relationships of friendship, trust, confidence, 
and liking (H~tkansson, 1987, pp. 11 and 13; H/ikansson and Johanson, 1993, pp. 22-23; Hall6n, 
1982, pp. 21 and 52; Johanson and Mattsson, 1987, p. 35). The time dimension is also relevant 
because learned behaviour is seen to play an important role in hybrid relations. The parties must 
learn to cooperate, rely on trust, and behave trustworthy vis-d-vis their counterpart (H/tkansson 
and Johanson, 1993, p. 23). All this indicates that IA assumes, or infers from observed practice, 
a different model of human motivation than that employed in TCE. I will return to this point in 
the next section of this paper. 
A related important difference between IA and TCE concerns the instrumentality of exchange 
relations. In TCE exchange relationships are considered to be purely instrumental. The possibil- 
ity that the exchange relationship influences the goals of the parties is not contemplated. IA on 
the other hand also considers the possibility that the process of exchange and the characteristics 
of relationships with others may alter an actor's definition of his goals and his view of the means 
to achieve them (H~tkansson, 1987, pp. 4 and 91). The very identity of an actor is seen as partly 
dependent upon his position in the network (Hakansson, 1989, p. 21; Nooteboom, 1994). This 
goes further than the insight that relationships, built up over a long period of time and at consid- 
erable cost, are large and important investments (H~tkansson, 1987, p. 10). The social content of 
the relationship, consisting in bonds of friendship, mutual trust and confidence, goes beyond the 
instrumental reasoning of TCE (cf. H/ikansson, 1987, p.  13). 
But perhaps the most important difference between both schools of thought is that the safe- 
guards which TCE considers the most important relationship characteristics (formal contracts and 
private ordering arrangements) are virtually neglected in IA. Safeguards are simply no element 
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1989, p. 17). This lack of attention to safeguards could be construed as an omission of IA. It is, 
however, consistent with what appears to be the underlying model of human agents employed in 
IA. IA differs from TCE in the key concepts of opportunism and bounded rationality. I will now 
turn to a discussion of these assumptions. 
OPPORTUNISM AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY ASSUMPTIONS 
Two behavioural assumptions have an important place in TCE: opportunism and bounded 
rationality. Without either of the two, the problem of economic organization is seen as trivial. If 
actors are perfectly rational every conceivable transaction can be safeguarded by a complete con- 
tract. If  there is no opportunism promises, good faith, and mutual adjustment can be used for coor- 
dination purposes. Safeguards are superfluous under these circumstances, and presuming they are 
costly, will be omitted. It is the combination of opportunism and bounded rationality that gives 
saliency to the choice of governance structure (Williamson, 1985). 
Williamson does not assume that all individuals are opportunistic to the same degree: "some 
individuals are opportunistic some of the time and [...] differential trustworthiness is rarely trans- 
parent ex ante. As a consequence, ex ante screening efforts are made and ex post safeguards are 
created" (Williamson, 1985, p. 64). However, the main thrust of TCE is to explain ex post safe- 
guards, the possibility of screening successfully for opportunism and consequently of being able 
to renounce from safeguards is hardly elaborated. In fact the only two allusions to screening in 
Williamson's  Economic  Institutions  of  Capitalism  suggest  that  this  remedy  is  impotent 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 58 and pp. 64-65). This concentration on safeguards and neglect of screen- 
ing  have  the  effect  of  suggesting  that  the  condition  of  opportunism,  notwithstanding 
Williamson's assertion to the contrary, is pervasive. 
IA is more differentiating in its approach to human nature. At the same time, IA's position is 
not always completely clear. What, according to the proponents of IA, makes safeguards rela- 
tively unimportant? As we have seen above, factors like friendship, trust, confidence, and liking 
are alluded to at various places. On the other hand, altruism is explicitly dismissed as the explana- 
tory factor for the importance of trust-based transaction  relations (Hfikansson and Johanson, 
1993,  p. 22). 
Instead, trust is seen as based on 'enlightened self-interest'. Economic agents know that oppor- 
tunistic behaviour in the present impedes profitable interactions in the future, and that their self- 
interest is best served by displaying trustworthiness (Hgtkansson and Johanson,  1993,  p. 22). If 
both parties act in this way, a relationship can be based on "mutuality", i.e.  "the belief that self- 
interest in the long run is best served by acknowledging and adapting to the interest of other 
actors" (H~tkansson and Johanson, 1993, p. 22). It seems fair to reconstruct the position assumed 
in IA as to imply that safeguards are in many cases relatively unimportant because of a combi- 
nation of emotional or normative constraints to opportunism and calculative considerations of 
enlightened  self-interest. Parties to intensive long-term relations often do not want to behave 
opportunistically, and they also often think that doing so would go against their own interests. If 
both parties know that their counterpart perceives the relationship in this way, safeguards are 
superfluous. 
The position vis-gt-vis  opportunism assumed by IA may be less clear than that of TCE, it also 
seems to be more in accordance with the world "as we know it". In conversations with business- 
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studies in the vein of TCE suggest that trust is an important element of transaction relations (cf. 
Lorenz, 1988; Palay, 1984). TCE, given its assumption of opportunism, can incorporate a con- 
cept like trust only in a very marginal way. Only if I know that the other acts in his own best inter- 
est by living up to his commitments, and if I also know that he knows this, can I rely on "trust" 
and abstain from safeguards. This kind of trust could be described as "confident expectation". 
But the first meaning of "trust", according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 
is the "firm belief in reliability, honesty, veracity, justice, strength, etc., of person or thing". There 
is little doubt that humans vary in their moral character. Experiments confirm the existence of 
differences in the tendency to behave opportunistically (Etzioni,  1988,  pp. 51-66; Frank,  1988, 
pp. 137-143; Kahneman et al., 1986). These differences, and their implications for transaction 
relations, are not acknowledged by received TCE. 
TCE may be criticized that the relentless opportunism its actors are assumed to display also 
undermines the proposed solutions to the problem of economic organization. For instance, it is 
difficult to understand how a system of contract law could arise or survive in a world of pure 
opportunists (Noorderhaven, 1992). Also, Williamson at times appears to smuggle in arguments 
that contaminate the purity of opportunism. Thus, in his discussion of managerial hierarchies he 
mentions "consummate cooperation" as one of the potential advantages of hierarchies over mar- 
kets. However,  no  consummate  cooperation  is  to  be  expected  from an  opportunistic  agent 
(Noorderhaven, 1995). 
As far as human information processing capacity is concerned, IA and TCE both utilize an 
assumption of "bounded rationality". But the implications for exchange relations emphasized by 
the two approaches are very different. In TCE bounded rationality is associated with the inabil- 
ity to write complete contingent contracts, as well as with the imperfection of enforcement pro- 
cedures (Williamson,  1985, p. 50). This is one of the reasons why markets under specified cir- 
cumstances give way to internal organization. IA sees bounded rationality as the main reason why 
firms have to cooperate in order to be effective. Effective operation and innovation can only suc- 
ceed if the knowledge and perspective of various actors are combined. As a consequence, IA con- 
centrates on the actual processes of cooperation and adaptation, while TCE focuses on the gov- 
ernance structures within which these processes take place (Nooteboom, 1994). 
A closer look at TCE shows that, bounded rationality notwithstanding, intentionality of human 
agents is assumed throughout (cf. Williamson,  1991b).  The "strong commitment to intended 
rationality" in TCE, the "semi-farsightedness" imputed to economic agents, and the focus on the 
question of "how [...] parties organize so as to utilize their limited competence to best advan- 
tage" corroborate this view (Williamson, 1985, pp. 46, 387 and 392). Furthermore, "the ramifi- 
cations of alternative contracts are intuited if not fully thought through" (Williamson,  1985,  p. 
38). This statement appears to imply that bounded rationality, although causing imperfections in 
governance structures, does not seriously stand in the way of a deliberate choice between these 
(imperfect) governance structures. 
However, if the assumption of bounded rationality is taken on board, we should also consider 
in which way limitations to human information processing capacity may influence decision mak- 
ing with regard to the choice between governance structures. Bounded rationality implies that 
decision makers use cognitive simplifications in order to reduce the complexity of problems that 
would otherwise overwhelm them (Hogarth,  1980).  One such simplifying heuristic is that of 
focusing: in order to be effective human decision makers have to concentrate their scarce atten- 
tion and cognitive resources on a limited number of problems (Berger et al., 1993; Legrenzi et 
al., 1993). This means that the decision makers in a firm at any given moment will be receptive 
to information concerning only a fraction of all of the firm's operations, and hence also focus TRANSACTION, INTERACTION, INSTITUTIONALIZATION  49 
only on a small number of its transaction relations. Presumably this will only be transaction rela- 
tions in which important changes occur or appear to be imminent. 
This means that there will be limited attention to the major part of the transaction relations. 
These will be dealt with on the basis of standard operating procedures and organizational rou- 
tines (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1993). Put differently: the accompanying pat- 
terns of behaviour have become "institutionalized". 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
"Institutionalized  behaviour",  as  seen  in  this  paper,  consists  in  standardized  interaction 
sequences supported and sustained by routine, taken-for-granted reproductive procedures (cf. 
Jepperson, 1991, p. 145).  Institutionalized behaviour, in as far as consisting in repeated interac- 
tion sequences, is associated with habitualization as described by Berger and Luckmann (1966, 
pp. 53-54).  Habitualization leads to parallel expectations, reduces uncertainty, and provides a 
psychic relief for boundedly rational actors. IA clearly acknowledges this aspect of long-term 
customer-supplier relations (H~tkansson,  1987, p. 16). Institutionalized behaviour is of a routine, 
taken-for-granted nature because these behavioural patterns are performed in  an unreflective 
way. This is caused by the fact that the perspectives and indeed the preferences of individual 
actors are influenced by institutional forces. This aspect of institutionalization is also to be found 
in IA (H~kansson, 1987, p. 91). 
Institutionalized behaviour by its very nature is shielded from the rational pursuit of self-inter- 
est: routinized rule-following behaviour is substituted for rational calculative decision making. 
Thus institutionalization provides a possible explanation of restraint from opportunism. If inter- 
action patterns in the context of a transaction relation between firms institutionalize, they shift 
out of the focus of rational deliberation. This means that opportunistic behaviour (which is very 
calculative) is neither considered by either party nor expected from the other. Consequently, safe- 
guards are no issue, and stability reigns. This inference is consistent with case studies bearing out 
the strong tendency of industrial buyers to persist in the use of existing suppliers (Woodside and 
Mtiller, 1992). 
Adoption of the assumption that transaction behaviour can be subject to institutionalization as 
described above constitutes a marked break with received TCE. The choice between governance 
structures like market agreements, more complicated contractual arrangements, or hierarchical 
organization can be seen as a choice between different institutional arrangements. But in received 
TCE the emphasis is very much on deliberate choice, and not on institutionalization as conceived 
in this paper, which substitutes routines for rational deliberations (cf. Williamson,  1991b). 
Incorporation of the concept of"institutionalization" into a theory emphasizing rational choice 
may seem paradoxical, as institutionalist and rational choice theory are sometimes seen as mutual 
exclusive paradigms. This is by no means a necessity, however. Rational choice explanations 
often feature institutional constraints, and institutionalist accounts often invoke rational adapta- 
tions to institutional conditions (Jepperson, 1991,  p. 157). 
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF HYBRID INTERFIRM RELATIONS 
Now a dynamic model of hybrid interfirm relations integrating elements of IA and TCE can 
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Joint technological development forms an important aspect of long-term customer-supplier 
relations in IA. Two overall patterns can be distinguished: step-by-step and leapwise technolog- 
ical development. Leapwise development is associated with radically new products and major 
investments;  step-by-step  development  with  a  continuous  stream  of  minor  technological 
improvements (HLkansson, 1989, pp. 38-41). In both cases cooperation between firms is impor- 
tant, but whereas gradual changes in the relationship typify the latter case, leapwise development 
brings about a fundamental change in the relative positions. 
In terms of the institutional theory described in the preceding section, the time-consuming 
process of step-by-step development will arguably be accompanied by institutionalization of 
interaction patterns. In the absence of major events or milestones, the scarce attention of decision 
makers will be diverted to other areas, and the relationship will be governed largely by routines 
and procedures. Leapwise development, to the contrary, will often rupture existing institutional- 
ized ties. A radically new situation presents itself, demanding the focus of managerial attention. 
Thus one of the two kinds of joint technological development distinguished by IA can be asso- 
ciated with high, the other with low levels of institutionalization. 
Turning now to TCE, the notion that investment in relation-specific assets may lead to depen- 
dence,  and  that  this  dependence  may  be  misused,  has  a  central  place  in  this  approach 
(Nooteboom, 1993). A basic assumption underlying TCE is that if an agent perceives himself to 
be vulnerable he will act in such a way as to protect himself. That is, the possibility that an agent 
knowingly enters into a relationship of unilateral dependence without asking for adequate safe- 
guards is ruled out. In the proposed model the link between asset specificity, dependency, and 
safeguards is adopted from TCE, with one important proviso: asset specificity leads to safeguards 
only if the dependent party is aware of its dependency and the concomitant risks. If the relation- 
ship in question is highly institutionalized, this will presumably not be the case. 
Of the four types of asset specificity distinguished in TCE one, human asset specificity, is 
clearly associated with step-by-step development. Human asset specificity consists largely in 
tacit knowledge and learning-by-doing that can only accumulate over time (Williamson, 1979). 
The other forms of asset specificity -- location specificity, physical asset specificity and invest- 
ments in dedicated assets -- are of a more discrete nature and are more likely to be the result of 
conscious investment decisions. These kinds of asset specificity bear resemblance to the category 
of leapwise developments distinguished in IA. 
Following the argumentation unfolded above, human asset specificity can be associated with 
high, and the other forms of asset specificity with low levels of institutionalization of interfirm 
relations. This means that in case of human asset specificity, built up gradually over time, the 
need for safeguards will not be felt. The other types of asset specificity, arising more instanta- 
neous as the result of deliberate investment decisions, will draw the focus of managerial atten- 
tion, and thus set in motion the deliberations that lead to the installation of safeguards. 
In a schematic form, three ideal types of interfirm relations can be discerned (in case of inter- 
nalization an interfirm relation no longer can be said to exist, therefore hierarchical governance 
is not included in the model): market governance, hybrid governance with safeguards, and hybrid 
governance without safeguards. In case of market governance asset specificity is low, and mutual 
adaptation very restricted. Elaborate safeguards are not necessary, as the parties remain relatively 
independent. In many market relations a contract in the legal sense of the word cannot even be 
said to exist, since there is an insufficient clear "meeting of the minds" (Macaulay, 1963). If(tech- 
nological) developments change the situation, the parties can simply alter the terms of the rela- 
tionship, or shift to other partners. 
Hybrid governance with  safeguards  corresponds to bilateral  and  trilateral  governance as TRANSACTION, INTERACTION, INSTITUTIONALIZATION  51 
described by Williamson (1985, 1991a). These relationships are characterized by high levels of 
asset specificity and mutual adaptation, and by safeguards installed in order to neutralize the per- 
ceived concomitant risks. These safeguards can take the form of complex contracts, specifying 
arrangements for price and quantity adjustments and providing for third-party arbitration (see, 
e.g. Joskow, 1985). Alternatively, the parties can make use of private ordering arrangements, e.g. 
in the form of joint ownership of, or symmetrical investments in relation-specific assets (cf. De 
Laat, 1994; Masten, 1984). 
Hybrid governance without safeguards corresponds to a third type of transaction relations, 
arguably not on Williamson's continuum between market and hierarchy. This type of hybrid has 
been referred to as "trust relations" (Bradach and Eccles, 1989), "relational contracts" (Macneil, 
1974), "contracting in the state of union" (Kronman, 1985), and "cooperative interorganizational 
relationships" (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). This ideal type also seems to correspond to the view 
of long-term customer-supplier relations maintained in IA. The absence of safeguards is here 
assumed to be caused by institutionalization: the more dependent party may not even be aware 
of asset specificity or adaptation, and if he is, he nevertheless does not perceive himself to be in 
a vulnerable position. Note that hybrid relations as described above by definition imply asset 
specificity/adaptation. 
The dynamic nature of the proposed model is embodied in propositions concerning shifts from 
one ideal type to another. Six kinds of governance shifts can be distinguished (see Fig. 1). 
Starting from market governance, two governance shifts are possible: to hybrid governance 
with and without safeguards (arrows 1 and 2 in Fig. 1). The argumentation contained in this paper 
suggests that the first kind of shift is associated with a rapid build-up of physical asset specificity, 
location specificity, or dedicated assets. For example: a supplier formerly producing inputs for a 
client using standard machinery is asked to invest in specialized equipment, to move his produc- 
tion facilities to a location adjacent to the client, or to substantially expand his facilities especially 
for that client. The logic of TCE, adopted here, predicts that the supplier will demand adequate 
safeguards of the legal or private ordering type. 
The second kind of shift (arrow 2) is associated with the gradual build-up of human asset speci- 
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ficity: time is invested to acquire new skills by learning-by-doing, etc. This is not the kind of 
investment  process  that  draws  attention,  hence  the  demand  for  safeguards  is  less  likely. 
Furthermore during the time it takes to develop this kind of asset specificity the relationship is 
subject to a gradual process of institutionalization which also makes a call for safeguards less 
likely. These expectations are capsulized in two propositions (all propositions are subject to the 
ceteris paribus condition): 
Proposition 1: 
Proposition 2: 
Rapid build-up of physical asset specificity, location specificity, or dedicated 
assets leads to hybrid governance with safeguards. 
Gradual build-up of human asset specificity leads to hybrid governance without 
safeguards. 
From hybrid governance with safeguards shifts to market governance and to hybrid governance 
without safeguards are possible. A shift to hybrid governance without safeguards (arrow 3) may 
be the result of the passage of time. Safeguards that have once been installed may be subject to 
erosion, e.g. because contract clauses are not adjusted to reflect changing circumstances, or 
because the value of collaterals is not adjusted to increased volumes of trade. The omission of 
safeguard maintenance is consistent with the model of institutionalization: with the passage of 
time the interaction becomes routinized and risks associated with asset specificity are given less 
attention. The result is a shift to hybrid governance without safeguards. The phrasing "without 
safeguards" should not be taken too literally in this context. Safeguards may still be present, but 
they no longer reflect the current situation and hence are inadequate. 
A shift from hybrid governance with safeguards to market governance (arrow 4) can be induced 
by technological development. The introduction of industrial robots, for instance, enables suppli- 
ers to some extent to produce customized components with general-purpose technology (Benders, 
1993). This is an example of leapwise technological development leading to accelerated depreci- 
ation of the relation-specific assets. The result is that safeguards are no longer needed, and ordi- 
nary market relations can prevail. Furthermore, progressive standardization of products and com- 
ponents is a normal feature of the lifecycle of industries. Thus, where strong ties with specialized 
suppliers may be a necessity in the embryonic phase of an industry, at later stages efficient mar- 
kets for inputs are more likely to develop. This leads to the following two propositions: 
Proposition 3: 
Proposition 4: 
In hybrid relations with safeguards the passage of time (without important new 
investments in relation-specific assets)  leads to a  shift to hybrid governance 
without safeguards. 
Leapwise technological development and maturation of the industry leading to 
obsolescence of relation-specific assets cause a shift to market governance. 
From hybrid governance without safeguards a shift to hybrid governance with safeguards (arrow 
5) can be expected in case of leapwise (joint) technological development, or if important invest- 
ments of the non-human type take place in the context of a relationship hitherto characterized by 
step-by-step development and institutionalization. According to Hgtkansson  (1989, p. 40) leap- 
wise developments are often preceded by a number of smaller steps, to find out if a new path is 
practicable. The final leap will according to the logic of the proposed model be accompanied by 
the deliberate design of safeguards.  Alternatively, the shift of hybrid governance without to 
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term relationship may nevertheless be continued (the acquired human asset specificity still has 
value), but now as a stable relationship of mutual distrust, governed by safeguards (cf. Heide and 
Miner,  1992). 
Finally, a shift from hybrid governance without safeguards to market governance (arrow 6) 
results if the know-how that once was specific to the relationship becomes widespread. This is a 
not unusual effect of the maturation of a technology or industry. Proprietary knowledge is sub- 
ject to leakage, and tacit know-how over time may become codified (Boisot, 1986). As a conse- 
quence, efficient markets for inputs develop, and the reasons for sticking to one particular trans- 
action partner dissipate. The last two propositions, then, are as follows: 
Proposition 5: 
Proposition 6: 
Leapwise technological development, important investments in relation-specific 
assets of the non-human kind, and breach of trust lead to a shift from hybrid gov- 
ernance without, to hybrid governance with safeguards. 
Dissemination of formerly relation-specific knowledge (human asset specificity) 
leads to a shift to market governance. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
If the premise is accepted that both TCE and IA have something to say about intensive, long- 
term buyer-seller relationships in industry, it is worthwhile investigating the possibility of con- 
structing a model integrating at least parts of these two approaches. Granted, the model sketched 
above is overly schematic, and the propositions are formulated too broadly to permit direct test- 
ing. But the model has several advantages compared to those of IA and TCE. It is more dynamic 
than that of TCE, takes more seriously the boundaries to human rationality, and is more differ- 
entiated in the assumption concerning opportunism. Compared to IA, the model explicitly takes 
into account the risks associated with asset specificity and adaptation, and includes propositions 
with regard to the use of safeguards. Furthermore, the propositions can be made more specific 
and confronted with empirical evidence. Given the dynamic nature of the model, this evidence 
will have to be of the longitudinal kind; the cross-sectional design used in most empirical work 
in the TCE tradition will not do. 
Difficulties in the operationalization and measurement are to be expected, but these problems 
do not appear to be unsurmountable. Operationalizations and measures of the various kinds of 
asset specificity and safeguards can be found in the literature (for overviews of empirical work 
see, e.g. Anderson,  1994 and Masten,  1994). 
On the basis of measurements of asset specificity and safeguards, transaction relations can be 
categorized as market relations or one of the two kinds of hybrids. This is by no means an easy 
task. Real-world transaction relations are always mixtures of the various ideal types. However, 
categorization is feasible if we focus on comparative dynamics.  The crucial  question  is not 
whether a given transaction relation at a given moment looks more like a market relation or like 
a hybrid with safeguards; but rather whether a shift in the direction of one of the ideal types actu- 
ally coincides  with  the conditions  specified by the  various  propositions. Thus,  if substantial 
investments in relation-specific physical assets are not accompanied by the installation of safe- 
guards this would constitute a refutation of the proposed model. 
In principle, the model can be tested without operationalizing the concept of institutionaliza- 
tion. If a high level of (human) asset specificity is not accompanied by safeguards, institutional- 54  N.G. NOORDERHAVEN 
ization of the relationship may be assumed.  However, the explanation becomes considerably 
stronger if institutionalization can be measured directly. This could conceivably be done by ask- 
ing managers point-blank whether they consciously deliberate about the governance of this or 
that relationship. This method of measurement can hardly be called unobtrusive, though. In a lon- 
gitudinal study the subjects would be unduly influenced by this kind of questions. A more indi- 
rect approach, consisting in observation, or unobtrusive questions regarding procedures and rou- 
tines, would be preferable. Clearly important difficulties still have to be solved particularly  with 
regard to this aspect of the proposed model. 
REFERENCES 
Alvesson, M. and Lindkvist, L., Transaction costs, clans and corporate culture, Journal of  Management Studies (1993), 
pp. 427-452. 
Anderson, E., Transaction  cost analysis and marketing,  paper for the conference on Transaction Cost Economics and 
Beyond (Rotterdam:  Erasmus University, 1994). 
Benders, J., Optional Options:  Work Design and Manufacturing Automation (Aldershot:  Avebury, 1993). 
Berger, J., Noorderhaven, N. G., Nooteboom, B. and Pennink, B. J., Understanding the subcontracting relationship: The 
limitations of transaction cost economics.  In: J. Child, M. Crozier and R. Mayntz et al. (Eds),  Societal Change Between 
Market and Organization  (Aldershot: Avebury, 1993), pp. 77-98. 
Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T., The Social Construction  of  Reality (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday,  1966). 
Boisot, M. H., Markets and hierarchies in a cultural perspective,  Organization  Studies (1986), pp. 135-158. 
Borys, B. and Jemison, D. B., Hybrid arrangements as strategic alliances: Theoretical issues in organizational combina- 
tions, Academy of  Management Review (1989), pp. 234-249. 
Bradach, J. L. and Eccles, R. G., Price, authority and trust: From ideal types to plural forms, Annual Review of  Sociology 
(1989), pp. 97-118. 
Coase, R., The nature of the finn, Economica N.S. (1937), pp. 386-405. 
Cyert, R.M. and March, J.G., A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1963). 
De Laat, P., Technological alliances: Securing trust by mutual commitments, Proceedings of the ESF conference on Inter- 
Organizational Networks:  Structures  and Processes (Berlin, 1994), pp. 435-464. 
Dwyer,  F.R., Schurr,  P.H. and Oh, S., Developing buyer-seller relationships, Journal of Marketing (1987),  April, pp. 
11-27. 
Etzioni, A., The Moral Dimension:  Towards a New Economics (New York: Free Press,  1988). 
Frank, R.H., Passions Within Reason:  The Strategic Role of the Emotions (New York: Norton & Company, 1988). 
Goldberg, V. and Erickson, J. R., Quantity and price adjustment in long-term contracts:  A case study of petroleum coke, 
Journal of  Law and Economics (1987), pp. 369-398. 
H~kansson,  H.  (Ed.),  Industrial Technological  Development:  A  Network  Approach  (Beckenham:  Croom  Helm, 
1987). 
H~kansson, H., Corporate  Technological  Behaviour:  Co-operation  and Networks (London: Routledge,  1989). 
HS.kansson, H.  and Johanson, J.,  A  model of industrial networks.  In: B. Axelsson and G. Easton (Eds),  Industrial 
Networks: A New View of  Reality (London: Routledge,  1992), pp. 28-34. 
H~hkansson, H. and Johanson, J., Industrial functions of business relations.  In: G. Grabher (Ed.),  The Embedded Firm 
(London: Routledge,  1993), pp. 15-31. 
Hallfn,  L.,  International Industrial Purchasing:  Channels,  Interaction,  and Governance  Structures (Uppsala: Acta 
Universitatis Upsaliensis, 1982). 
Hallrn, L., Johanson, J. and Seyed-Mohamed,  N., Interfirm adaptation in business relationships, Journal of Marketing 
(1991), pp. 29-37. 
Heide, J. B. and Miner, A. S., The shadow of the future: Effects of anticipated interaction and frequency  of contact on 
buyer-seller cooperation,  Academy of  Management Journal (1992), pp. 265-29 i. 
Hogarth, R. M., Judgement and Choice: The Psychology of  Decisions (Chichester:  Wiley, 1980). 
Jarillo, J. C., On strategic networks, Strategic Management Journal (1988), pp. 31-41. 
Jepperson, R. L., Institutions,  institutional effects, and institutionalism.  In: W. W. Powel and P. J. DiMaggio (Eds), The 
New Institutionalism  in Organizational Analysis (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press,  1991  ), pp. 143-163. 
Johanson, J. and Mattsson, L.-G., Interorganizational relations in industrial systems: A network approach compared with 
the transaction-cost approach, International Studies of  Management & Organization  (1987), pp. 34--48. 
Joskow, P. L., Vertical integration and long term contracts: The case of coal-burning electric generating plants, Journal 
of Law, Economics,  and Organization  (1985), pp. 33-80. 
Joskow,  P. L., Contract duration and relation-specific investments: Empirical evidence from coal markets,  American 
Economic Review (1987), pp. 168-185. TRANSACTION, INTERACTION, INSTITUTIONALIZATION  55 
Joskow, P. L., Price adjustment in long-term contracts: The case of coal, Journal of Law and Economics (1988), pp. 
47-83. 
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L. and Thaler, R. H., Fairness and the assumptions of economics, Journal of  Business (1986), 
pp. s285-s300. 
Kogut, B., Joint ventures: Theoretical and empirical perspectives, Strategic Management Journal (1988), pp. 319-332. 
Kronman, A. T., Contract law and the state of nature, Journal of Law, Economics,  and Organization  (1985), pp. 5-32. 
Larsson, R., The handshake between invisible and visible hands, International Studies of Management & Organization 
(1993), pp. 87-106. 
Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V. and Johnson-Laird, P. N., Focusing in reasoning and decision making, Cognition  (1993), pp. 
37-66. 
Lorenz, E. H., Neither friends nor strangers: Informal networks of subcontracting in French industry. In: D. Gambetta 
(Ed.), Trust: Making and Braking Cooperative  Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 194--210. 
Lyons, T. F., Krachenberg, A. R. and Henke, J. W., Jr., Mixed-motive marriages: What's next for buyer-seller relations?, 
Sloan Management Review (1990), pp. 29-36. 
Macaulay,  S., Non-contractual relations in business: A preliminary study, American Sociological  Review (1963),  pp. 
55-70. 
Macneil, I. R., The many futures of contract, Southern California Law Review (1974), pp. 691-816. 
March, J. G. and Simon, H. A., Organizations,  second edition (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993). 
Masten, S. E., The organization of production: Evidence from the aerospace industry, Journal of Law and Economics 
(1984), pp. 403-417. 
Masten, S. E., Empirical research  in transaction-cost economics:  Challenges,  progress,  directions,  paper for the con- 
ference on Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond  (Rotterdam: Erasmus University, 1994). 
Monteverde,  K. and Teece,  D. J., Appropriable rents and quasi-vertical integration, Journal of Law and Economics 
(1982), pp. 321-328. 
Mulherin, J. H., Complexity in long-term contracts: An analysis of natural gas contractual provisions, Journal of Law, 
Economics,  and Organization  (1986), pp. 105-117. 
Noorderhaven,  N.  G., The problem of contract enforcement in economic organization theory, Organization  Studies 
(1992), pp. 229-243. 
Noorderhaven, N. G., Transaction cost analysis and the explanation of hybrid vertical inter-firm relations, Review of 
Political Economy (1994), pp. 19-36. 
Noorderhaven, N. G., The argumentational texture of transaction cost economics, forthcoming in Organization  Studies 
(1995). 
Nooteboom, B., An analysis of specificity in transaction cost economics, Organization  Studies (1993), pp. 443-451. 
Nooteboom, B., Transactions and networks: Do they connect? Forthcoming in: J. Groenewegen (Ed.), Dynamics of the 
Firm: Strategies of  Pricing and Organisation  (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1994). 
Palay, Th. M., Comparative institutional economics: The governance of rail freight contracting, Journal of  Legal Studies 
(1984), pp. 265-287. 
Powell, W. W., Neither market nor hierarchy: Network forms of organization, Research in Organizational  Behavior 
(1987), pp. 295-336. 
Ring, P. S. and van de Ven, A. H., Structuring cooperative relationships between organizations, Strategic Management 
Journal (1992), pp. 483-498. 
Ring, P. S. and van de Ven, A. H., Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational relationships, Academy 
of Management Review (1994), pp. 90-118. 
Semlinger, K., New developments in subcontracting: Mixing market and hierarchy. In: A. Amin and M. Dietrich (Eds), 
Towards a New Europe? Structural Change in the European Economy (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991), pp. 96-115. 
Williamson, O. E., Markets and Hierarchies (New York: Free Press, 1975). 
Williamson, O. E., Transaction cost economics: The governance of contractual relations, Journal o  fLaw and Economics 
(1979), pp. 3-61. 
Williamson, O. E., Credible commitments: Using hostages to support exchange, American Economic Review (1983), pp. 
519-540. 
Williamson, O. E., The Economic Institutions of Capitalism;  Firms, Markets,  Relational Contracting  (New York: Free 
Press, 1985). 
Williamson, O. E., Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural alternatives, Administrative 
Science Quarterly (1991a), pp. 269-296. 
Williamson, O. E., Economic institutions: Spontaneous and intentional governance, Journal of Law,  Economics,  and 
Organization  (1991b) (special issue), pp. 159-187. 
Woodside, A. G. and Mtller, K., Middle range theories of industrial purchasing strategies, Advances in Marketing and 
Purchasing (1992), pp. 21-59. 